The Seller Knows More

Written by Studio AM.

A used-car seller may know years of service history, while a buyer has had only a short inspection. Economists call this unequal knowledge asymmetric information. It can make trade difficult even without a deliberate lie.

Consider a simplified market where buyers cannot distinguish sound cars from faulty ones. They offer a price reflecting the risk that any car may need repairs. At that price, some owners of good cars decide to keep them. The remaining cars are then less attractive on average, which can lead buyers to lower offers further. Under some conditions, this process drives more good cars out of the market.

Possible remedies help buyers judge quality or share the risk. Independent inspections and reliable service records provide evidence about condition. A meaningful warranty makes the seller responsible for specified problems, so it may be more costly to offer on an unreliable car. Its value still depends on the terms and whether the seller will honour them.

The issue is not simply that one side needs a lower price. Better information and enforceable commitments can make transactions possible that uncertainty would otherwise prevent.

Questions

Choose an answer. The explanation appears after you answer.

  1. Question 1 of 4

    Which statement best captures the passage's argument?

  2. Question 2 of 4

    What do some owners of good cars do when the offered price is too low?

  3. Question 3 of 4

    A seller offers a warranty but cannot be reached when repairs are needed. Why might it do little to reassure buyers?

  4. Question 4 of 4

    In this passage, "asymmetric information" means

Score: none answered yet.

More passages

Practise reading